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BETTING AGAINST THE HOUSE: CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA’S 
STAND AGAINST ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN HOME CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS 
 
Devin Ryan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The fellow that owns his own home is always just coming out of a hardware store.”1  In 
reality, sometimes a trip to a hardware store will not nearly be enough to repair a home, such as 
when the repairs needed can be incredibly immense or numerous.  When those situations arise, 
homeowners must pursue other options.  For homeowners like Alon Frumer and Michelle 
Berliner Frumer, that option is mandatory arbitration.2  In Frumer v. National Home Insurance 
Co., the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division held an arbitration clause as valid 
when it was included in a home warranty agreement mandating arbitration as the exclusive 
remedy for resolving major structural defects claims.3  Other states do not share New Jersey’s 
recent support of arbitration clauses in new home construction contracts and warranties. 
In California and Nevada, courts and lawmakers are taking a stand against these 
arbitration clauses.  Nevertheless, builders in these states continue to include mandatory 
arbitration clauses in sales contracts or warranty related documents.  As a result, arbitrators are 
resolving homebuyers’ claims of structural defects and related actions.  While the effect of this 
may seem minor at first, the fallout of the 1990s and early 2000s home building boom has 
produced a score of homebuyers’ defects claims.  Therefore, a great deal of litigation has stayed 
off court dockets and been resolved privately through arbitration.   
The increase in defects claims can be best described as follows: 
The furious pace of home building from the late 1990s through the first 
half of the 2000s contributed to a surge in defects, experts say. It 
caused shortages of both skilled construction works and quality 
materials. Many municipalities also fell behind inspecting and 
certifying new homes . . . At the height of the boom in 2005, more than 
two million house were built in the U.S., according to the National 
Association of Home Builders, a trade group. Criterium Engineers, a 
national building-inspection firm, estimates that 17% of newly 
constructed houses built in 2006 had at least two significant defects, up 
from 15% in 2003.4 
   Many of the homebuyers in California and Nevada are now filing suit alleging 
structural defects, as these two states, in particular, have “experienced a surge in construction-
                                                     
* Devin Ryan is Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2013 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Nathalie Montreuil, EVERY DAY QUOTES, 138 (2010) (quoting American humorist Kin Hubbard). 
2 See Frumer v. Nat’l Home Ins. Co., 18 A.3d 225, 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (holding a mandatory 
arbitration clause that covered major structural defects in a home warranty agreement was valid). 
3 Id. at 229. 
4 M.P. McQueen, Cracked Houses: What the Boom Built, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 13, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/. 
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defect claims in recent years.5  What these homebuyers are encountering, however, is that their 
claims are governed by mandatory arbitration clauses, preventing them from bringing suit in 
court.  Homebuilders, either through the sales contract or warranty related documents, have been 
including these clauses more often than in years past.  This has left some homeowners feeling 
“hamstrung” by the clauses.6  In response, California and Nevada have attempted to curb the 
enforceability and applicability of mandatory arbitration clauses.7 
Outside of California and Nevada, however, states embrace mandatory arbitration clauses 
as a speedy and less expensive remedy that will clear out the courts’ dockets and provide final 
adjudication.8  Despite homebuyers’ general hostility to arbitration clauses, these states view the 
clauses as extremely beneficial to judicial economy and, in many cases, in the interest of both 
parties.  Unsurprisingly, the National Association of Home Builders, a non-profit trade 
association, shares this view.9 
But critics allege that the public policy favoring consumer protection outweighs any gains 
in judicial efficiency.  They cite the need for legal protection because of the unequal bargaining 
power between homebuilders and homebuyers.  Furthermore, they acknowledge the substantial 
monetary and life investment the buyers make in the transaction.  Nevertheless, as this article will 
illustrate, California and Nevada law provide that mandatory arbitration in home construction 
contracts can be enforced so long as the homebuilders follow appropriate procedures.   
This article will address California and Nevada’s approach to mandatory arbitration 
clauses, the future implications of these clauses, and the necessary measures homebuilders and 
warranty providers should take to have the clauses enforced. 
II.  MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN HOME CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS 
A. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Home Construction Contracts in California 
In California, California Civil Procedure Code section 1281 follows the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and provides that arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable and 
                                                     
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 In Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 487-88 (Cal. 2005), the Supreme Court of California 
observed that the legislature provided for two devices to waive the right to a jury trial prior to a dispute: arbitration 
agreements and judicial reference provisions. 
8 See, e.g., Harrington v. Pulte Home Corp., 119 P.3d 1044 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding mandatory 
arbitration clause in home purchase contracts and compelling homebuyers to arbitrate their claims that homebuilders 
did not disclose that a pilot training aerobatic box and jet engine test facility were nearby); In re U.S. Home Corp., 236 
S.W.3d 761 (Tex. 2007) (holding that an arbitration clause in a warranty book, which provided that a party “may 
request” arbitration, made arbitration binding once the homebuilder requested it); Zeleny v. Thompson Homes at 
Centreville, Inc., 2006 WL 2382829 (Del. Super. Ct. July 10, 2006) (holding arbitration clause in housing contract 
warranty required binding arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims of leaks and other defects). 
9 Washington Update, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS (Mar. 26, 2010), 
http://nahbenews.com/nahbwash/issues/2010-03-26.html (“NAHB strongly supports the use of alternative dispute 
resolution, including binding arbitration, as the most rapid and cost-effective means of resolving disputes. Invalidating 
binding arbitration provisions in contracts would undermine decades of jurisprudence strongly favoring arbitration of 
disputes where the parties have agreed to use the arbitration process. NAHB opposes any attempt to prohibit the use of 
pre-dispute arbitration in contracts.”). 
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irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.”10  In this respect, 
California courts will invalidate mandatory arbitration clauses in home construction contracts on 
the basis of unconscionability, as it is a ground that “exist[s] for the revocation of any contract.”11  
California’s broad application of unconscionability differs heavily from that of other state courts.  
1. Federal Preemption of Section 1298.7 of the California Code 
Despite the great latitude California courts afford unconscionability, California 
lawmakers identified a need for further protection of homebuyers attempting to bring certain 
claims against homebuilders.  The result was California Civil Procedure Code § 1298.7, which 
provided that an arbitration provision “shall not preclude or limit any right of action for bodily 
injury or wrongful death, or any right of action to which Section 337.1 or 337.15 is applicable.”12  
This was read to mean that despite language to the contrary in a home construction contract’s 
arbitration clause, a homebuyer could still bring defects claims in court.  The court later found 
that the FAA, however, preempted this limitation on arbitration.13 
In Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, the plaintiffs brought suit alleging 
construction defects caused by plumbing pipes installed by defendants and damaged further by 
the defendants’ subcontractor.14  The pipes leaked and “water damaged interior finishes, 
carpeting, cabinets and drywall.”15  The plaintiff alleged that the water damage created toxic 
mold, and that he suffered personal injury from exposure to that mold.  The real estate purchase 
agreement, however, contained an arbitration provision, which stated that all disputes arising out 
of the contract must be resolved by binding arbitration.16  The defendant filed a motion to compel 
arbitration, but the plaintiff opposed the motion, stating that Section 1298.7 prohibited the court 
from granting the motion.  The trial court denied the motion to compel because it found that the 
defendants “failed to demonstrate the transaction involved interstate commerce.”17  The 
defendants appealed and argued that the FAA preempted Section 1298.7.  The appellate court 
held that construction of the plaintiff’s substantially affected interstate commerce because five 
materials suppliers provided supplies that originated outside of California to the defendant for use 
in constructing the house; therefore, “the FAA preempt[ed] contrary state law [Section 1298.7] in 
this case.18   
                                                     
10 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1281; accord Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
11 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1281. 
12 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 337.1, 337.15 govern the statute of limitations for claims relating to construction or 
improvement of real property.  Section 337.1 states that actions for damages “from persons performing or furnishing 
the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision or observation of construction of an improvement to real 
property more than four years after the substantial completion of such improvement.”  Section 337.15 states that an 
action to obtain damages “from any person, or the surety of a person, who develops real property or performs or 
furnishes the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction or 
construction of an improvement to real property” cannot be brought “more than 10 years after the substantial 
completion of the development or improvement.” 
13 See Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enters., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 327. 
16 Id. at 327–28. 
17 Id. at 328. 
18 Id. at 328, 333. 
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This was consistent with the appellate court’s ruling in Basura v. U.S. Home Corp.19  In 
Basura, sixty homebuyers brought suit against the defendant alleging design and construction 
defects after a variety of problems arose, including “cracked foundation slabs.”20  The sales 
agreements contained arbitration clauses that covered any disputes arising out of the agreement.  
In twenty-eight of the contracts, however, the defendant did not initial the arbitration clause.21  
The defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, but the plaintiffs argued that Section 1298.7 
allowed their suit to go forward.  The court held that Section 2 of the FAA preempted Section 
1298.7 of the California Code because “the California statute is a state law applicable only to 
arbitration agreements, allowing a purchaser to pursue a construction and design defect action 
against a developer in court, despite having signed an agreement to convey real property 
containing an arbitration clause.”22  The court’s ruling aligned with Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto, where the Court held that “[c]ourts may not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements 
under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”23 
2. California Courts Turn to Unconscionability 
After the federal preemption of Section 1298.7, the courts turned to unconscionability to 
limit the impact of mandatory arbitration agreements in home construction contracts.  A series of 
cases followed which addressed the issue of whether mandatory arbitration clauses’ in home 
construction warranties were unconscionable: Baker v. Osborne Development Corp.;24 Bruni v. 
Didion;25 and Adajar v. RWR Homes, Inc.26 
First, in Baker v. Osborne Development Corp., homeowners sued the homebuilder, 
Osborne, arguing that several houses were defective.27  Problems with the houses included “soil 
movement; foundation deficiencies; plumbing leaks; stucco, window, and roof problems; finish 
problems relating to cabinets, floor tiles, and countertops; and problems with the framing and 
electrical, heating, plumbing, and ventilation systems.”28  Osborne filed a motion to compel 
arbitration and argued that an arbitration agreement in the warranty booklet mandated arbitration 
of the claims.  In addition, the Builder Application signed by both parties and sent to Home 
Buyers Warranty Corporation stated that the parties consented to the terms and the binding 
                                                     
19 Basura v. U.S. Home Corp., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328 (Cal. App. Ct. 2002). 
20 Id. at 330. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 333; cf. Woolls v. Superior Ct., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 438-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the state 
law mandatory notice provision was not preempted the FAA and the arbitration agreements were unenforceable 
because “[t]he instant case, involving the renovation of a single family residence, lies at the opposite end of the 
spectrum from Basura, which involved the construction of a large scale housing development” and the defendant failed 
to make any factual declarations that the transaction involved interstate commerce). 
23 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
24 Baker v. Osborne Dev. Corp., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. App. Ct. 2005). 
25 Bruni v. Didion, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395 (Cal. App. Ct. 2005). 
26 Adajar v. RWR Homes, Inc., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 17 (Cal. App. Ct. 2005).  All three cases involve new home 
construction warranty programs provided by Home Buyers Warranty Corporation (“HBW”), a Colorado corporation.  
To obtain coverage under the program, a builder sends an enrollment fee and application formed signed by both the 
builder and the buyer.  See Baker, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 857; Bruni, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 402; Adajar, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
19. Then, HBW sends the buyer a certificate of warranty coverage and a warranty book. See Baker, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
857; Bruni, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 402. 
27 Baker, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 857. 
28 Id. 
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arbitration provision.29  The homebuyers countered by stating at the time they signed the Builder 
Application, the only arbitration clause they knew of was in the sales agreement.  That arbitration 
provision limited its application to disputes over the deposit of funds in escrow.30  In fact, the 
homebuyers only received the booklet a few weeks after moving into their homes.  The court held 
that the arbitration agreement was “both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and 
therefore unenforceable.”31  The agreement was procedurally unconscionable because Osborne 
failed to alert the homebuyers to the arbitration clause, meeting the surprise element, and the 
parties had unequal bargaining power, meeting the oppressive element.32  It was also 
substantively unconscionable because the arbitration clause was “one-sided.”33 
Similarly, in Bruni v. Didion, the homebuyers were not told to read the warranty, which 
contained an arbitration clause, before signing it and were never told how the warranty would 
affect their legal rights.34  Some homebuyers received the warranty documents after signing, 
while some never received them at all.  In addition, the arbitration provisions “[took] up roughly 
one full page in a 30-page booklet,” which was entirely “in single-spaced, 10-point type.”35  The 
arbitration provisions also were “not distinguished from the rest of the booklet by either bolding 
or capitalization.”36  The court held that the arbitration clauses were procedurally unconscionable 
because the clauses were practically hidden from the homebuyers, the defendants failed to inform 
the plaintiffs about the clauses, and the sales agreement was a contract of adhesion.  Furthermore, 
the arbitration clauses were substantively unconscionable because they violated the plaintiffs’ 
reasonable expectations.37 
Finally, in Adajar v. RWR Homes, Inc., the homebuyers signed a warranty application, 
which provided that by signing, they affirmed that they saw a video about the warranty and 
received a sample warranty booklet.38  In addition, the application provided that by signing, the 
homebuyers agreed to the terms of the binding arbitration provision.  At trial, however, the 
builders were unable to produce a copy of the sample booklet and submitted 2001 and 2002 
versions of the actual warranty instead.39  The homebuyers argued that they could not be bound 
by the unknown terms of an arbitration provision and that most of them did not receive a video or 
a copy of the sample warranty booklet.  The court held that the builders failed to prove the 
existence of an arbitration agreement.40  The court distinguished this case from Wise v. Tidal 
Construction Co.,41 where the buyer signed a warranty application attached to a warranty booklet 
containing the arbitration clause.  The court stated that if the builders produced the actual 
arbitration clause, as the builder did in Wise, the case might be different.42  But considering 
Adajar and the two preceding cases, Baker and Bruni, it is difficult to see the court enforcing the 
arbitration clause contained in the warranty booklet.   
                                                     
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 858. 
31 Id. at 864. 
32 Id. at 863. 
33 Id. at 864. 
34 Bruni, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404. 
35 Id. at 413. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 414. 
38 Adajar, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 19. 
39 Id. at 20. 
40 Id. at 22. 
41 Wise v. Tidal Constr. Co., 583 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. 2003). 
42 Adajar, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 24. 
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One common thread ties all of the above cases together – the homebuyers did not actually 
receive the warranty documents, which contained the arbitration clauses, until after they signed 
the sales contract.  While reference was made to the existence of arbitration clauses, the buyers 
were not afforded the opportunity to read the warranty’s actual terms.  It appears that so long as 
homebuilders, and by extension warranty providers, supply the actual arbitration agreement to the 
buyer prior to or at the closing, the arbitration agreement will generally be upheld. 
Why then do these cases keep arising in California?  Are homebuilders and warranty 
providers trying to backdoor arbitration agreements into their sales contracts and warranty 
provisions?  Or are they making honest mistakes and not learning from them? 
B. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Home Construction Contracts in Nevada 
Nevada courts also oppose mandatory arbitration provisions in home construction 
contracts.  Similar to California, Nevada courts are sympathetic to homebuyers because of the 
unequal bargaining power in sales of new homes.  Examination of Nevada’s approach will focus 
on three cases: Burch v. Second Judicial District Court of State of ex rel. County of Washoe;43 
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green;44 and Gonski v. Second Judicial District Court of State of ex rel. 
County of Washoe.45 
We begin with Burch v. Second Judicial District Court of State of ex rel. County of 
Washoe, where the plaintiffs, James and Linda Burch, purchased a new home constructed by the 
defendant in 1997.46  Four months after the closing, the defendant gave Linda Burch a thirty-one-
page warranty booklet supplied by HBW and asked her to sign a warranty application form to 
enroll in HBW’s warranty.  She signed the application but did not read the warranty booklet.47  
The warranty covered material and workmanship defects for one year; electrical, plumbing and 
mechanical systems defects for two years; and structural defects for ten years.  In 1999, the 
plaintiffs noticed severe problems with their house, including “saturated floor joists, wet 
insulation, muddy ground, and a wet, moldy foundation.”48  Consequently, they asked the 
defendant to remedy the problems.  Mediation attempts fell through, so the plaintiffs filed 
complaint in district court.49  The defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the 
district court granted after concluding that the parties entered into a valid contractual agreement 
to arbitrate.  The plaintiffs then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, later granted by the 
Supreme Court of Nevada.50  The court held that the arbitration clause in the warranty booklet 
was unconscionable and unenforceable.51  The court noted that the clause was procedurally 
unconscionable because the plaintiffs were told the warranty would offer “extra protection for 
                                                     
43 Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct. of State ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 49 P.3d 647 (Nev. 2002). 
44 D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159 (Nev. 2004). 
45 Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct. of State of ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 245 P.3d 1164 (Nev. 2010). 
46 Burch, 49 P.3d at 648. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 649. 
49 Id.   
50 Id. at 440. Note that at the time of this case, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.205 held that court orders granting a 
motion to compel arbitration were not immediately appealable.  Due to this, parties would file a petition for a writ of 
mandamus to challenge the motion to compel.  The governing statute for a writ of mandamus is NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 34.170, which states that a “writ shall be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of law.  It shall be issued upon affidavit, on the application of the party beneficially interested.” 
51 Burch, 49 P.3d at 651. 
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their home,” did not have an opportunity to read the application or booklet or watch the HBW 
video, were not “sophisticated consumers,” did not understand the warranty’s terms, and could 
not easily find the arbitration clause.52  The clause was substantively unconscionable because it 
granted the defendant’s insurer, NHIC, “the unilateral and exclusive right to decide the rules that 
govern the arbitration and to select the arbitrators.”53  The court noted, however, that it was not 
“hold[ing] that a homebuyer warranty with an arbitration clause will always be unconscionable or 
unenforceable,” but that in this case, “the HBW and its arbitration clause [were] unconscionable 
and, therefore, unenforceable.”54 
The court expanded on Burch in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green.  In D.R. Horton, the 
plaintiffs purchased homes from the defendant builder.55  The two-page sales agreements, printed 
in very small font, contained an arbitration clause at the bottom of the second page.  “With the 
exception of the paragraph title, which was in bold capital letters like the other contract headings, 
nothing drew special attention to this provision.”56  Neither of the plaintiffs “understood that they 
would be required to fund one-half of the expenses of the arbitration and that these expenses 
could be more costly than standard litigation.”57  This was contrary to Nevada statute Section 
40.655(1)(a), which allowed a construction defect claimant to “recover attorney fees or other 
damages proximately caused by the construction defect controversy.”58  After several problems 
developed with their homes, the plaintiffs notified the defendant that they intended to bring 
construction defect claims.  After the mediation process was unsuccessful, the defendant 
demanded arbitration.59  The plaintiffs responded by filing a complaint in district court seeking a 
declaration that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable.  Then the defendant filed a motion 
to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied.60  While the Supreme Court of Nevada found 
that the sales agreement was not a contract of adhesion, as the trial court did, it held that the 
arbitration agreement was unconscionable because “it was inconspicuous, one-sided and failed to 
advise the Homebuyers that significant rights under Nevada law would be waived by agreeing to 
arbitration.”61 
Lastly, in Gonski v. Second Judicial District Court of State of ex rel. County of Washoe, 
the plaintiffs purchased a home in a housing development from the defendant.62  Months after the 
purchase, the plaintiffs alerted the defendant to several construction defects.  After mediation 
attempts failed, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court.63  Then, the defendant attempted 
to enforce two arbitration agreements, one in the sales agreement and the other in a limited 
warranty.  The district court found that the arbitration agreements were not unconscionable and 
granted the motion to compel arbitration.64  The plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, 
which the Supreme Court of Nevada granted.  The court held that the arbitration agreement was 
                                                     
52 Id. at 650. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 651. 
55 D.R. Horton, 96 P.3d at 1160. 
56 Id. at 1161. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1164. 
59 Id. at 1161. 
60 Id. at 1162. Under NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.247(1)(a), motions denying a motion to compel arbitration are 
immediately appealable. 
61 D.R. Horton, 96 P.3d at 1163, 1165. 
62 Gonski, 245 P.3d at 1166. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1168. 
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unconscionable.65  While the arbitration clause’s procedural unconscionability from the signing 
and failure to highlight was low, the substantive unconscionability was high because it failed to 
“adequately address the arbitration costs and disregard[ed] . . . NRS Chapter 40 rights.”66 
From these cases, it appears that Nevada courts follow a similar approach to California.  
Recognizing an apparent need for added consumer protection in home construction contracts, the 
courts place a heavy emphasis on homebuilders making arbitration clauses readily identifiable 
and fully providing them to homebuyers, with an opportunity to read, before the closing. 
C. Future Implication 
The future implications of mandatory arbitration clauses in home construction contracts 
are plentiful. Primarily, they facilitate the recovery of the real estate market by efficiently 
resolving disputes born out of the real estate boom.  Mandatory arbitration clauses in home 
construction contracts have softened the potential blow of the surge in construction defects claims 
on the real estate market.  Homebuilders already struggling in California and Nevada have not 
been exposed to lengthy, more expensive lawsuits arising from homebuyers’ construction defects 
claims.  As a result, they have been able to keep costs down, which undoubtedly aids in their 
recovery.   
Additionally, the privacy of arbitration results in a restoration of confidence in 
homebuilders.  Public lawsuits exposing construction defects, at a time when new homebuyers 
are scarce, could lead to more potential buyers abstaining from purchasing a new home.  While 
this may seem as though buyers are being blindfolded from the problem of construction defects 
so that homebuilders can gain some public confidence, the near future will tell whether the 
increase in defects claim truly arose from a shortage of quality workmanship in the wake of the 
housing boom.  But with the real estate market in recovery, will workmanship improve because 
homebuilders are no longer struggling to keep up with demand?  Or will workmanship decrease 
or remain the same because homebuilders are trying to cut costs, leading them to hire less skilled 
and cheaper contractors?  Only time will tell. 
Conversely, some homebuyers feel slighted by not being able to bring suit in court to 
recover damages from their defects claims.  This disposition is fueled by parties such as Home 
Owners Against Deficient Dwellings (“HADD”), a consumer interest group that advises 
homeowners to “[a]void arbitration clauses” because “[a]rbitration can be biased in the 
company’s favor, and it’s private so others can’t find out about complaints.”67  Further, despite 
the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, a federal interest may be argued to exist in 
protecting homeowners’ ability to bring suit in court.  If a homeowner’s “loan is financed through 
the FHA [Federal Housing Authority] or VA [Department of Veterans’ Affairs] and you file a 
claim against the third-party warranty company, [the homeowner] can choose between arbitration 
or going to court.”68  Therefore, it appears as though the federal government has identified an 
interest in protecting homeowners’ ability to resolve warranty claims in court.   
                                                     
65 Id. at 1173. 
66 Id.; see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.655(1)(a). 
67 Binding Arbitration, HOME OWNERS AGAINST DEFICIENT DWELLINGS, (Dec. 5, 2008),  
http://www.hadd.com/arbitration (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
68 Warranties for Newly Built Homes: Know Your Options, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,  
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/homes/rea03.shtm (last modified April 24, 2009). 
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Ultimately, however, the many benefits of enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses in 
new home construction contracts outweigh any perceived detriments.  Arbitration is generally 
cheaper and will provide a quicker remedy for homeowners and homebuilders alike.  When 
problems with homes develop, homeowners are forced in many cases to live in hotels, with 
family, or with friends while their houses are repaired.  These repairs can be lengthy and, in some 
situations, impossible.  Adding a lengthy adjudication process to the traumatic effect of 
construction defects is too much for consumers.  They should realize that arbitration often 
provides a better, less costly, and more expedient solution than a civil suit. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In the end, California and Nevada are invalidating arbitration agreements on the grounds 
of unconscionability when other states are enforcing those agreements.  The courts in these states 
hinge their decisions on whether failure of homebuilders to alert homebuyers of the clauses and 
what they provide; whether the print was a larger font size, capitalized, or bolded; whether the 
terms of the arbitration clause were given to the homebuyers prior to the closing; and whether the 
homebuyers had an opportunity to read the arbitration clause.   
Beneath the reasoning of these court decisions lies a disposition disfavoring arbitration 
clauses in home construction contracts.  What these courts should realize, however, is that 
arbitration contracts aid in the recovery of the real estate market. In addition, despite increased 
construction defects claims, courts have benefited from less cases clogging up their dockets. 
At the same time, however, it should be stated that not all arbitration clauses in home 
construction contracts should be enforced.  Inevitably, courts in California and Nevada will 
rightly declare some clauses unconscionable.  However, these courts should join the majority of 
jurisdictions and lighten their stance on arbitration clauses in home construction contracts. 
